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Abstract
After the emergence of the Internet, an interesting
question arises that what is its impact on the firms’
channel and pricing strategies. This paper applies game
theory to study the strategic interactions between rational
manufacturers, retailers, and consumers, and it generates
the following results: 1. The presence of the Internet
allows imperfectly competitive manufacturers to better
coordinate their pricing, targeting, and channel strategies,
thereby minimizing the agency costs involved in common
dealing at the traditional outlets, which in turn enhances
the manufacturers’ profits. 2. Exclusive dealing may and
may not become more prevalent in the presence of the
Internet. It all depends on the ratio of the population of
switchers to the entire population of consumers. 3. The
presence of the Internet allows a monopolistic
manufacturer to screen consumers by serving different
people at different outlets. Screening is less effective,
however, in the case of imperfect competition. 4. A
dynamic adjustment process is obtained which describes
how a manufacturer should optimally change his channel
and pricing strategies when the population of the Internet
purchasers grows over time.

1. Introduction
The prevalence of the Internet brings a great deal of
business opportunities and potential markets. For one
thing, manufacturers do not have to rely on retailers to sell
their products to final consumers. Through the Internet,
they can directly contact worldwide consumers and have
better understanding about what consumers want and need.
Similarly, retailers can also serve consumers that they
could not have reached otherwise. However, by making
searching easier for consumers, the Internet is said to
intensify price competition. For example, Bakos [1]
suggests that lower search cost on the Internet would lead
to more severe price competition and lower profits.
Brynjolfsson and Smith [2] show empirically that the
price competition on the Internet is sharper than that in
traditional channels for standard products like CD and
books. However, some scholars have opposite views and
think that a low search cost will not necessarily intensify
price competition. For example, Lal and Sarvary [3] point
out that for non-digital products under some conditions,
consumers who search in the absence of the Internet may
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shop their familiar brands on the Internet without
searching. Therefore, it is possible that the presence of the
Internet not only enhances the consumer loyalty but also
eases the price competition between firms.
Before the emergence of the Internet, manufacturers
could only sell their products to consumers in the
traditional channels. If the channel is not vertically
integrated, manufacturers have to contact consumers
through retailers. In general, a manufacturer hopes that
retailers can provide various in-store promotions for its
product to increase its sales volume, including in-store
advertisement, displaying its product, or even persuading
consumers to switch to the manufacturer’s brand on the
point of purchase. However, the retailer who maximizes
the profits from its assortments would promote the brand
with the highest profit margin. In fact, the retailer may
even use the leading brand with a lower margin to build
traffic while persuade consumers to buy another
high-margin brand on the point of purchase. To solve the
incentive problems, the manufacturer could choose
exclusive dealing [5]. Exclusive dealing is a contractual
arrangement between a manufacturer and its dealers
where the latter agree not to carry brands competing with
the manufacturer’s brand In contrast, under common
agency, manufacturers allow their dealers to carry brands
competing with their own. One stream of previous
literature centers on how the channel structures, in
particular, exclusive dealing or common retailer, chosen
by competing manufacturers affect the intensity of
competition among manufacturers. Mathewson and
Winter [6] argue that the retailer would not accept
exclusive dealing offered by a manufacturer unless the
associated wholesale price is low enough, which implies
intensive potential competition between manufacturers in
order to be selected as the only brand carried by the
retailer. Others argue that under exclusive dealing, the
perceived demands of manufacturers are more inelastic
than under common dealership, thus softening the
upstream competition [4] [8]. It happens because under
exclusive dealing a manufacturer knows that the decrease
in its wholesale price will result in not only the decrease in
its own retail price but also the retail price of a competitive
product set by the other exclusive dealer. In addition to the
associated intensity of competition, cost is another
concern when manufacturers consider whether to impose
exclusive dealing or not. When manufacturers sell

products through a retailer, they would incur a setup cost.
Under common agency, manufacturers could share the
setup cost, thus having a positive externality compared
with exclusive dealing.
The emergence of the Internet channel may give
manufacturers a way to overcome a retailer’s incentive
problems. The Internet channel differs from traditional
channels in two important ways. First, on the Internet it is
consumers that decide what information to search and to
retrieve. Therefore, online retailers can not
influence/change consumers’ brand preferences as much
as traditional retailers. Second, the Internet channel can
not reach consumers who do not have access to the
Internet. Manufacturers when designing their optimal
channel strategies must take into account the distinctive
properties of the traditional channel and the Internet
channel into account.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we
analyze how the presence of the Internet may help
manufacturers alleviate a traditional retailer’s incentive
problems. Second, we characterize imperfectly
competitive
manufacturers’
equilibrium
channel
strategies in the presence of the Internet.
To achieve the above two objectives, we consider a
model with two manufacturers and two traditional
retailers. For each manufacturer’s brand, there are two
kinds of customers, loyals and switchers. The segment of
loyals have higher reservation price for the
manufacturer’s brand and will not be influenced by
traditional retailers on the point of sales. In contrast, the
segment of switchers have lower reservation price and can
be persuaded by traditional retailers to buy the competing
brand. Before the emergence of the Internet, a
manufacturer marketing strategy crucially depends on two
factors. The concern for double marginalization, which
determines the segments that manufacturers want to serve
and the retailer’s persuasion power affects the choice of
exclusive dealing or common agency. After the
emergence of the Internet, the consumer market is
redefined according to whether consumers have access to
the Internet. Thus the proportion of consumers using
Internet and the difference in cost between traditional
channel and Internet channel would also affect the
manufacturers’ channel design and the targeting decisions
in different channels. This paper applies game theory to
study the strategic interactions between rational
manufacturers, retailers, and consumers, and it generates
the following results:
1. The presence of the Internet allows imperfectly
competitive manufacturers to better coordinate their
pricing, targeting, and channel strategies, thereby
minimizing the agency costs involved in common dealing
at the traditional outlets, which in turn enhances the
manufacturers’ profits.
2. Exclusive dealing may and may not become more
prevalent in the presence of the Internet. It all depends on

the ratio of the population of switchers to the entire
population of consumers.
3. The presence of the Internet allows a monopolistic
manufacturer to screen consumers by serving different
people at different outlets. Screening is less effective,
however, in the case of imperfect competition, a dynamic
adjustment process is obtained which describes how a
manufacturer should optimally change his channel and
pricing strategies when the population of the Internet
purchasers grows over time.

2. Literature Review
One of The issues that attract many researchers’
attention after the prevalence of the Internet is how the
Internet affects the intensity of competition among firms.
Although some scholars (eg, Lal and Sarvary, 1999) argue
that the non-digital attributes of products may influence
consumer behavior, which are decided by the concern of
extra transaction cost, and cause the favor of existing
brand. According to this argue, the firm will face better
pricing condition. Nevertheless, most people agree that
the development of the Internet has reduced searching
cost and made consumers get information easily, which
will lead price competition and sharply reduce price level.
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) have empirically studied
the price competition in two categories - CD and books –
to exam whether the price competition on Internet would
be more severe than the traditional channel. CD and books
are both highly homogeneous products, which means that
the product quality will not vary within different channels.
The result shows that the product prices on web are lower
than on brick, which means that pricing wars are more
intensely on virtual world. Besides, the shift scale of price
on web store is 1% of it on physical store, which means
that the Internet trades possess lower menu cost and are
more sensitive on price. Interestingly, the price dispersion
among web retailer is larger than which among
conventional retailer, and the leading firms in CD and
books market are not the one who marked the lowest price.
Firms adopt low price strategy shared few market value,
which means purchasing cost is not the only concern of
buying decisions even there are homogenous products.
The degree of trust in website, brand, and service are
important to buying decisions. Consequently, the
homogenous products may not necessarily lead to
competition on price on virtual channel.
Exclusive dealing is a commitment between
manufacturer and retailer thatretailers agree not to carry
the competing brands. That means a manufacturer
requires its retailers only to sellits products. The issues of
exclusive dealing in the past researches can be categorized
into three types: one is the impact of exclusive dealing to
social welfare; two is the equilibrium channel structure,
including exclusive dealing, common dealing, and vertical
integration; three is how other marketing variables, like
price and promotion, change under different channel
structure.

O’Brien and Shaffer (1993) correct Lin’s (1990)
error and argue that manufacturers eventually choose
exclusive dealing as its channel structure among exclusive
dealing, common dealing and vertical integration. In their
setting, the competition at retail level is monopoly and
duopoly under common agency and exclusive dealing
respectively. For this reason, common agency gives the
retailer the power to threat manufacturers to sell only one
products. Therefore, manufacturers could not extract all
profits under common agency but could under exclusive
dealing. In addition, manufacturers can alleviate
competition through retailers, thus it is optimal for
manufacturers to choose exclusive dealing. It is worthy to
notice that the retailer’s pricing strategy with common
agency is like product line pricing, so the consumer
surplus will be extracted at most. Compared to exclusive
dealing, consumer surplus under common agency is even
lower.
Many studies do not consider vertical integration,
and they only focus on the manufacturers’ choice between
exclusive dealing and common agency. Bernheim and
Whinston (1985) model the retail competition as perfect
competition and the retail prices are set by manufacturers.
It results the manufacturer would delegate some
marketing decisions to common agency in order to collude
with each other. That is because common agency provides
an indirect mechanism through which competing
manufacturers may “sell out” to a single retailer, thereby
creating incentives which generate a collusive outcome. It
is worth to note that the results critically depend on that
the manufacturer has the power to set retail price.
Besides Bernheim and Whinston, Besanko and Perry
(1993) also model perfect competition at retail level. They
continue Marvel’s (1982) study on free-rider problem.
Marvel indicates that a manufacturer can solve the
free-rider problem through exclusive dealing. For a
leading brand manufacturer, it must invest much money
on advertisements to let consumers aware its brand and
purchase in advance. When consumers come to the
retailer’s outlet, they may be attracted by other competing
brands because of the low prices, thus a strange
phenomenon that the manufacturer invests but increases
the competitor’s sales arises. After the leading
manufacturer chooses exclusive dealing, the incentive
problem disappears and the benefits of advertisements are
surely owned by the manufacturer itself.
Besanko and Perry transform the free-rider problem
into interbrand externality. Interbrand externality is that
when manufacturers are common agency, the benefits of
their investments are shared with each other, and hence
the effect is two-sided not one-sided like Marvel’s. Their
study explores that manufacturers would use exclusive
dealing if the costs of investment were not too high.
Because a manufacturer possesses whole benefits of the
investment, it induces to spend more money on
advertisements and the competition is thus more intensive.

The results in O’Brien and Shaffer or Bernheim and
Whinston implicate that the channel structure in the
market is unique, but Besanko and Perry allow different
equilibrium under different conditions, and it is closer to
the real world. They also prove that exclusive dealing
could maximize the social welfare under and thereby it is
not right to forbid exclusive dealing from the view of
social welfare.
Mathewson and Winter (1987) considers a
asymmetric market, where manufacturers have different
marginal production cost and the retailer is a monopoly.
Because the retailer is monopoly, manufacturers have to
compete on wholesale price if they want to impose
exclusive dealing. They argue that when the cost has big
difference, the dominant manufacturer, with lower
marginal cost, could guarantee itself the market by
imposing exclusive dealing without its wholesale price
declining too much. Thus, the equilibrium is exclusive
dealing. Obviously, Mathewson and Winter also allow
different channel equilibrium in different marketing
environment.
Lal and Villas-Boas (1996) consider a more general
model, where manufacturers and retailers are all duopoly.
In their model, the situation that one retailer distributes
one product and the other retailer distributes both products
may arise, so the intrabrand competition is under
consideration. They argue that if the retailer-loyal
segment is not too large, manufacturers both choose
common agency. That is because if the retailer-loyal
segment is too large, it provide higher incentive to
decrease wholesale price.
There are three contributions in our study. First, we
introduce multiple marketing channel in discussing
exclusive dealing and common agency. Because retailers
have different marketing power and consumers have
different ability to access the Internet in different channel,
it gives manufacturers a chance to screen by channels. The
idea is that manufacturers should induce different
segments to shop in different channels. When the
consumer structure in a channel is more homogenous, the
competition between manufacturers decreases and it leads
them to be more profitable. Second, given the level of
externality, the equilibrium is not thus unique. In Besanko
and Perry’s (1993) study, they use the share of investment
to express externality, and once the level of externality is
given, we could know the equilibrium channel structure.
In our study, we use the setup cost to express the
externality, and even the level of externality is high,
manufacturers may not choose common agency
eventually. That is because we consider the retailer’s
ability of persuasion. Because a retailer could persuade
consumers to purchase some brands, manufacturers would
lower wholesale price to induce the retailer to persuade for
him, and it leads to intensive competition under common
agency. By using the characteristic that retailers have
different persuasion power in different channel, we can

show that the level of externality is not enough to decide
the equilibrium. Third, the discussions about the
preferences of exclusive dealing or common dealing are
short of consideration of the cost difference. It implies that
the cost of two kinds of dealing is the same (Lin, 1990;
O’Brien & Shaffer, 1993). Marvel (1982) and Besanko &
Perry (1993) take the advertisement cost into account.
Although the exclusive dealing will raise the
manufacturers’ investment on advertisement and common
dealing will ease off such competition for the reason of
external effect, they also assume that the advertising costs
are indifferent between exclusive dealing and common
dealing. Our study argues that the establishments of each
retail outlet will have a fixed cost. It can be shared if
manufactures choose common dealing but not for the
exclusive dealings case. It means that manufactures
should consider the different costs between exclusive
dealing and common dealing.

3. Model
In the market, there are two manufactures,
manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2, producing brand 1
and brand 2, respectively. In this article, we sometimes use
N1 and N2 to represent manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2.
Assume the production cost is 0 for both manufacturers
without loss of generality. The population of consumers is
normalized to 1, including 4 segments: (1) Segment G1: it
consists of consumers who are loyal to brand 1 and have
their reservation prices for brand 1 and brand 2 equal to H
and 0, respectively. The proportion of this segment is
(1-q)/2. (2) Segment B1: it consists of consumers who are
the switchers of brand 1 and have their reservation prices
for brand 1 and brand 2 equal to M and L, respectively.
The proportion of this segment is q/2. (3) Segment G2: it
consists of consumers who are loyal to brand 2 and have
their reservation prices for brand 1 and brand 2 equal to 0
and H, respectively. The proportion of this segment is
(1-q)/2. (4) Segment B2: it consists of consumers who are
the switchers of brand 2 and have their reservation prices
for brand 1 and brand 2 equal to L and M, respectively.
The proportion of this segment is q/2. Let H > M > L > 0
and 0≦q≦1.
From the discussion in section 2, we know the
competition among online retailers on the net is more
intensive than the traditional channel in general. Thus, we
assume there are two retailers R1, R2 in the traditional
channel, but there are many potential retailers on the
Internet. Especially, only the retailers in the traditional
channels have the ability to persuade consumers and
change their preferences. A retailer can persuade
consumers in B1 or B2 to buy their less preferred brand by
incurring a persuasion cost C and raising their reservation
price for their less preferred brand from L to M. in contrast,
consumers in G1 and G2 can not be influenced by the
retailer’s persuasion effort. To highlight the importance of
persuasion power of retailers at the traditional channels,
we let L=0.After emergence of the Internet, a part of

consumers have the ability to shop on the net. Let αG and
αB be the proportions of the Internet users in the segment
of loyals and in the segment of switchers, respectively.
The sequence of the game can be described as
follows. First, the two manufacturers simultaneously
decide which distribution channel(s) to use. Then they
simultaneously choose only one retailer to sell their
product for each chosen distribution channel. Then the
contacted retailers accept or reject manufacturers’ offers.
Whenever the two manufacturers choose the same retailer
to distribute their products, the common dealership occurs;
otherwise, manufacturers adopt exclusive dealing. Then
manufacturers set their wholesale prices and given the
wholesale prices retailers set their retail prices. l1 As for
the Internet channel, since there are many potential online
retailers who will offer attractive contract in order to
obtain the dealership from manufacturers. As a result, the
retailer who gets the dealing right can not charge any retail
price higher than its marginal price.
Denote the cost of setting up a retail outlet in the
traditional channel by KT and on the Internet be KE. R1 and
R2 set retail prices P1, P2 given the wholesale prices w1 and
w2, and decide whether to influence a consumer’s
purchase decision by incurring a persuasion cost C.
Besides, online retailers persuade consumers, which
implies that the persuasion cost on Internet is assumed to
be infinite.
Before shopping, consumers know the selling prices
and their reservation prices of the two brands, and they
seek to maximize their consumer surplus when choosing
the product to buy. Consumers make their brand choice on
the point of sales, which may be influenced by the retailer
they shop at. To focus on the impact of the Internet on
manufacturers’ channel strategies, we deliberately
abstract from the effect of consumer’s differing
preferences towards different distribution channels by
assuming that the shopping cost of consumers at
traditional channels is the same as on the Net and is equal
to 0.
In what follows we use (Xi,Yj) to denote an
equilibrium where X-type consumers are served in the
traditional channel and Y-type consumers are served on
the Internet and i (j) indicates the type of dealership
adopted in the traditional channel (Internet channel ,
respectively), either exclusive dealing (denoted by E) or
common dealing (denoted by C).
The game proceeds as follow:
1. N1, N2 choose exclusive dealing or common dealing.
2. After the determination of channel structure, N1, N2
set wholesale price w1, w2.
3. R1, R2 set retail price P1, P2.
4. Consumers choose shopping channel
1

This formulation is similar to that of Lin [4] and O’Brien
& Shaffer [8.]

5. The retailer chooses whether to persuade.
6. Consumers choose brand.

holds. Simplifying the above inequality gives us:

Before the emergence of Internet

By (3-1), when the persuasion cost is high enough,
both manufacturers will be content with their own
customers, making it possible to sustain the equilibrium
(AC,0), the manufacturer’s profits in this equilibrium are

C ≥ [qM − q(1 − q ) H ] / 2(1 + q )

Before the emergence of the Internet, the manufactures
have to decide whether to distribute their product through
the same retailer (i.e., common dealing) or different
retailers (i.e., exclusive dealing), and which segments of
consumers to target. Through exclusive dealing,
manufactures are able to avoid the intensive price
competition resulting from the retailer’s incentive
problem. Through common dealing, manufacturers can
share the setup cost. Since manufactures are symmetric in
every aspect, the equilibrium is also symmetric. The four
possible equilibria are as follows:
1. Equilibrium (GC,0): Both manufacturers only serve
their respective loyals through a common retailer (N1→
(G1,0)；N2→(G2,0)).
In equilibrium, the wholesale prices are set at the
loyals’ reservation price H, and so are the retail prices. In
the equilibrium, the loyals’ consumer surplus is
completely extracted as in the monopoly case. The total
channel profits are accrued to the manufacture and equal
to

π 1M = π 2M = (1 − q ) H / 2 − KT / 2 .

2. Equilibrium (AC,0): Both manufacturers serve all
consumers in their respective markets through the
common retailer (N1→(G1+B1,0)；N2→(G2+B2,0)).
First note that in order to induce the retailer to serve
all consumers in manufacturers’ respective market by
setting the retail price at M, manufacturers would set their
wholesale prices satisfying ( M − w) / 2 ≥ (1 − q )

( H − w) / 2 . The condition ensures that the retailer
obtains higher profits when serving each manufacturer’s
switchers than otherwise. When this is the equilibrium,
w1 = w2 = [ M − (1 − q ) H ] / q .
Now we need identify the condition under which it is
not profitable for each manufacturer to attract its rival’s
switchers by lowering its wholesale price and thus sustain
the above equilibrium. To this end, we shall first derive the
wholesale price that induces the retailer to switch
consumers for the deviating manufacturer and then show
that the resulting manufacturer profit is lower than staying
in the equilibrium. When one manufacturer, say N1,
the
condition,
deviates
by
lowering
w1,

(1 + q)(M − W1 ) / 2 + (1 − q)[ M − ( M − (1 − q) H ) /

q] / 2 − C ≥ ( M − W1 ) / 2 + [ M − ( M − (1 − q) H / q] / 2
, must be satisfied in order to induce the retailer to incur a
cost C and persuade manufacturer 2’s switchers to buy
brand 1. Thus manufacturer 1 has to lower his wholesale
price until w1 = [ M − (1 − q ) H − 2C ] / q in order to
induce the retailer to switch his rival’s consumers to buy
brand 1. Finally, manufacturer 1 would prefer staying in
the equilibrium to deviating if the condition,
[M − (1 − q)H ] / 2q ≥ (1 + q)[M − (1 − q)H − 2C] / 2q ,
(3-1)

π 1M = π 2M = M − (1 − q) H / 2q − K T / 2

. When
condition (3-1) does not hold, once the manufacturers
choose the same retailer, they will compete with each
other on the basis of the wholesale prices to obtain the
retailer’s support, as will be shown in the fourth possible
equilibrium.
3. Equilibrium (AE,0): Both manufacturers serve all
consumers in their respective markets through their own
exclusive retailer (N1→(G1+B1,0)；N2→(G2+B2,0))
When each manufacturer serves consumers through
their exclusive retailer, he does not need to worry about
the retailer’s persuasion power. Therefore, his pricing
strategy is the same as in the monopoly case with the
wholesale
price
equal
to

w1 = w2 = [ M − (1 − q) H ] / q .
4. Mixed strategy equilibrium: both manufacturers
mixed pricing strategy through common dealing
When (3-1) does not hold, for example, when the
proportion of switchers (q) is high or/and the persuasion
cost is low enough neither manufacturer will content
himself with serving his own customers. Each
manufacturer would like to attract his rival’s switchers
through the retailer’s persuasion power by offering a more
attractive wholesale price to the retailer, thus resulting in a
severe price competition between manufacturers. On the
other hand, each manufacturer can guarantee a marginal
profit (1 − q ) H / 2 by serving his own loyals only. Thus
the manufacturer will not cut his price lower than
(1 − q) H /(1 + q) to attract his rival’s switchers for in
the latter case the resulting manufacturer profits
[(1 − q ) H /(1 + q )] * (1 + q) / 2 are lower than in the
former case. In fact, in the same spirit of Varian [9] and
Narasimhan [7], there exists only the mixed strategy
equilibrium where each manufacturer randomizes his
wholesale price according to a distribution function. The
manufacturer whose wholesale price turns out to be more
attractive would succeed in obtaining the retailer’s
support in attracting his rival’s customers for him. In this
mixed strategy equilibrium, the expected profits for each
manufacturer are π 1 = π 2 = (1 − q ) H / 2 − KT / 2 ,
the same as the manufacturer would obtain by serving his
loyals only.
M

M

Proposition 1: Let the reservation price of the
loyals’ be 1 and that of the switchers’ be k (0≦k≦1).
Suppose that the setup cost in the traditional channel

is the same as on the Internet, i.e. K T = K E = K .

Before the emergence of the Internet, the respective
conditions for each equilibrium to occur are as
follows:
Equilibrium Equilibrium conditions

(G C ,0)

k ≤1− q2

C

( A ,0)

k ≥ 1− q2;
k ≤ [q (1 − q ) + 2(1 + q )C ] / q

E

k ≥ 1 − q 2 + Kq;
k ≥ [q (1 − q ) + 2(1 + q )C ] / q

( A ,0)

Mixed
1 − q 2 ≤ k ≤ 1 − q 2 + Kq;
strategy
k ≥ [q(1 − q) + 2(1 + q)C ] / q
equilibrium
Table 1 The equilibrium conditions before the emergence
of the Internet
The conditions above are derived from the following
logic. To sustain equilibrium, the equilibrium profits have
to be larger than any other profits that are derived from
other possible strategies. Take equilibrium (AC,0) as an
example. When manufacturers are in this equilibrium,
they have no incentives to serve their respective loyals and
to induce the retailer to persuade consumers to buy his
brand. The former condition is equal to satisfy

k ≥ 1 − q 2 , and the later condition is equal to satisfy
k ≤ [q(1 − q ) + 2(1 + q )C ] / q . As a result, the two
inequalities are the conditions to sustain equilibrium
(AC,0). We can infer other equilibrium conditions by the
same logic.

By Figure 1, it is easy to show that which equilibrium
happens depends on the switchers’ value. When there are
more switchers in the market or their reservation price is
higher, we can say the switcher is more valuable. When
the switcher is not so valuable, manufacturer wants to set
the highest wholesale price H to serve the loyals only, it
leads to equilibrium (GC,0). When the switcher’s value is
higher but not too high, manufacturers have the incentives
to serve all his own consumers but not the rival’s
switchers, so they can share a retail outlet peacefully and it
is the equilibrium (AC,0). When the switcher’s value is too
high, if manufacturers choose a common retailer, both of
them can not satisfy with serving their own customers
only, and it means they will have more intensive price
competition. Thus, they are will to have more setup cost to
avoid such price competition.

After the emergence of the Internet
After the emergence of the Internet, two things are
different from before. First, manufacturers can sell
products through the Internet channel where retailers have
much less influence on consumers’ preference than in the
traditional channel. Second, as mentioned in the model,
not all consumers can access the Internet and thus the
proportions of the Internet users in the segment of loyals
(denoted byαG) and in the segment of switchers (denoted
by αB) would determine the structure of the consumer
market and hence the manufacturer’s optimal channel
strategy. The following lemma shows that manufacturers
will choose common dealing whenever they sell products
on the Net.
The problems facing each manufacturer include
whether to sell his product through the traditional channel,
the Internet channel or both, for each distribution channel
whether to choose the common dealing or exclusive
dealing, and whether to serve his loyals only or switchers
as well. There are eight possible symmetric pure strategy
equilibriums when manufacturers can distribute their
products either through the traditional channel or the
Internet channel. We describe them in the following.

Figure 1 The equilibriums before the emergence
of the Internet
Note:
1: Equilibrium (GC,0);
3: Equilibrium (AE,0);
Γ 1: k = 1 − q

2: Equilibrium (AC,0);
4: Mixed Equilibrium

2

Γ2: k = [ q (1 − q ) + 2(1 + q )C ] / q
Γ3: k = 1 − q + Kq
X-axis: q; Y-axis: k
2

1. Equilibrium (GC,0): both manufacturers only serve
the loyals in the traditional channel through common
dealing (N1→(G1,0)；N2→(G2,0)).
2. Equilibrium (AC,0): both manufacturers serve all
consumers in the traditional channel through common
dealing (N1→(G1+B1,0)；N2→(G2+B2,0)).
3. Equilibrium (AE,0): both manufacturers serve all
consumers in the traditional channel through exclusive
dealing (N1→(G1+B1,0)；N2→(G2+B2,0)).
4. Equilibrium (0, GC): both manufacturers only serve
their loyals on the Internet through common dealing.
In the above equilibrium, manufacturers set the
wholesale prices at the loyals’ reservation price H and so

do retailers set the retail prices.
manufacturers are

The profits of

π = π = (1− q)αL H / 2 − KE / 2 .
M
1

M
2

5. Equilibrium (0, AC): both manufacturers serve all
consumers on the Internet through common dealing
Because the retail market on the Internet is competitive,
retailers can not charge any price higher than their
marginal cost, i.e., the wholesale price charged by the
manufacturers. As a result, the manufacturer can serve all
consumers who can access the Internet in his protected
market by setting his wholesale price at the switchers’
reservation price M. The profits of manufacturers equal

π 1M = π 2M = [(1 − q)α L + qα S ]M / 2 − K E / 2 .
6. Equilibrium (GC, AC): both manufacturers sell their
products through the two distribution channels under
common dealing. The manufacturers induce all their
customers who can access the Internet to buy their
products on the Net and serve their loyals who can not
access the Internet in the traditional channel.
In equilibrium (GC, AC), each manufacturer would
like to serve his switchers on the Net and thus sets his
wholesale price at M. Given this wholesale price, the
online retailer would set the retail price also at M (again
because of competition) while the traditional common
retailer would set the retail price at H. Facing the two
different retail prices, all consumers who can access the
Internet would buy their preferred brand on the Net by
paying a cheaper price and only the loyals who can not
access the Internet buy their preferred brand from the
traditional retailer. The manufacturer’s profits are

π 1M = π 2M = [(1 − q) + qα S ]M / 2 − ( KT + K E ) / 2 .
7. Equilibrium (AC, AC): both manufacturers sell their
products through the two distribution channels under
common dealing. The manufacturers induce all their
customers who can access the Internet to buy their
products on the Net and serve their remaining customers
in the traditional channel.
When the consumers who can access the Internet are
induced to the Net, the structure of remaining consumers
in the traditional channel would change. To serve all
consumers that stay in the traditional channel, the
manufacturers would set their wholesale prices at

common dealing on the Internet and with exclusive
dealing in the traditional channel.
If (3-2) is not satisfied, it means that when
manufacturers adopt the strategy S(AC,AC), they would
have incentives to attract the competitor’s switchers
through the retailer’s persuading, thus breaking the
equilibrium (AC, AC). When the proportion of the loyals
who can access the Internet is higher than that of the
switchers, inducing all Internet users to buy on the Net
would lead the proportion of the switchers in the
traditional channel relative to that of the loyals increases.
Therefore, if manufacturers choose S(AC,AC),
manufacturers would compete aggressively on their
wholesale prices with the hope that the common retailer
can attract their rival’s switchers for them. To avoid such
competition, manufacturers may choose exclusive dealing
in the traditional channel, resulting in the equilibrium (AE,
AC).
Proposition 2: Let the reservation price of the
loyals be 1 and that of the switchers’ be k (0≦k≦1).
Suppose that the setup cost in the traditional channel
is the same as that in the Internet channel, i.e.,

K T = K E = K . After the emergence of Internet, the

conditions for equilibrium (GC,0) to occur are as
follows:2
Follow the same logic as in proposition 1. When a
equilibrium is sustained, the profits derived from other
strategies are always less than the equilibrium profits.
Take equilibrium (GC,0) as an example. A manufacturer
has five possible alternative strategies. One is to serve all
consumers in the traditional channel; two is to serve the
loyals on the net; three is to serve all consumers on the net;
four is to serve the loyals in the traditional channel and all
consumers on the net; five is to serve all consumers in
both channel. Compare the equilibrium profits with others
derived from these strategies, and then we can get the
inequalities stated in proposition 2.

1− q ≤ k ≤ 1− q

2

k ≥1−q2 &
k ≤[q(1−q) +2(1+q)C]/ q

M − (1 − q )(1 − α G )( H − M ) / q (1 − α B ) to ensure

the common retailer the same profits as those when
serving the loyals only. This wholesale price is positively
related to α G and negatively related to α B .With the
similar reasoning used in deriving (2-1), we can derive the
following lower bound for the retailer’s persuading costs
in order to sustain the equilibrium:

C≥

q2 (1 − αB )2 M − q(1 − q)(1 − αB )(1 − αG )(H − M )
2(1 − q)(1 − αG ) + 4q(1 − αB )
(3-2)
E

C

8. Equilibrium (A , A ): serve all consumers with

2

Because of the page limitation, we do not list these
conditions here.

k ≥ 1 − q2 + Kq;;
k ≥ [q(1 − q) + 2(1 + q)C] / q

Figure 2 The equilibrium after the emergence of the
Internet
Note:
1. Equilibrium: 1: (GC,0); 1’: (AC,0); 1’’: (AE,0); 2:
(GC,AC); 3: (AE,AC); 4: (AC,AC); 5: (0,AC)
2. X-axis:αB ; Y-axis:αG
3. Path A: more switchers can access the Internet than
the loyals;
Path B: more loyals can access the Internet than the
switchers
4. Parameter value: k=0.35, 0.4, 0.8 (from left to
right); q=0.8; C=0.05; K=0.05

Corollary 2-1: Keep the preferences and
proportions of the loyals and the switchers constant.
Suppose that the proportion of consumers who are
able to access the Internet increases over time. Then
the manufacturers’ equilibrium distribution strategy
will be dynamically adapted to the proportions of
Internet loyals and Internet switchers.
Keeping other parameters constant, figure 2 shows
that how the manufacturers’ equilibrium distribution
strategy varies with αG and αB. Before the emergence of
the Internet (or equivalently, when both αG and αB equal
zero), depending on the importance of switchers
(represented by the size of k) and the retailer’s persuasion
cost, the equilibrium could be (GC,0), (AC,0) or (AE,0),
which correspond to equilibrium 1, equilibrium 1’ and
equilibrium 1’’ in the three graphs, respectively. With the
increase in the proportion of Internet users, the
equilibrium distribution strategy will be dynamically
adjusted. The way in which the equilibrium distribution
strategy adjusted crucially depends on the relative sizes of
αG and αB. Two cases can be distinguished: the case
whereαG ≦ αB, and the case where αG ≧ αB.

in figure 2, with the emergence of the Internet, the
distribution equilibrium may change from equilibrium (AE,
0) into (GC,AC) as long as αB is high enough relative to α
G. The manufacturer by expanding into the Internet
channel, can induce a relatively higher proportion of
switchers to buy his product on the Net, which enables
him to serve only the loyal non-Internet users in the
traditional channel and thus do not need worry about the
traditional retailer’s incentive problem of switching his
customers. When αB is high enough relative to αG, the
benefit from alleviating the retailer’s incentive problem
will outweigh the loss of the non-Internet users in the
segment of switchers, thus leading to the equilibrium
(GC,AC) . As more and more consumers can access the
Internet, (0,AC) becomes the equilibrium strategy.
In the case where αG ≧αB, as shown by the path B
in figure 2, with the emergence of the Internet and the
increase in the proportion of the Internet users, the
distribution equilibrium may change from equilibrium
(AC, 0) first into (AE, AC), and finally into (AC,AC) as long
as αB is high enough relative to αG. The manufacturer by
expanding into the Internet channel, can induce a
relatively higher proportion of loyals to buy his product
on the Net, which aggravates the retailer’s incentive
problem of stealing customers but mitigating the
manufacturer’s concern for double-marginalization. The
latter benefit will outweigh the former cost when αB is
small enough relative to α G, thus resulting in the
equilibrium (AE, AC). In other words, the manufacturer
uses exclusive dealing to overcome the traditional
retailer’s incentive problem and alleviate the
double-marginalization problem by mitigating loyals to
the Internet channel. When the proportion of Internet
users in the segment of switchers keeps increasing, it
becomes less desirable for either manufacturer to induce
the retailer to persuade customers and hence the
equilibrium changes into (AC,AC). As more and more
consumers can access the Internet, (0,AC) becomes the
limiting equilibrium.
Corollary 2-2: Whether common dealing becomes
more prevalent after the emergence of the Internet
crucially depends on the structure of the consumer
market, in particular, the importance of loyal
switchers, and the proportions of Internet users in the
segment of loyals and in that of switchers ( α G and

α B ).
1. If k ≥ 1 − q + Kq and k ≥ [q(1− q) + 2(1+ q)C] / q ,
common dealing becomes more prevalent in the
presence of the Internet channel;
2

2. If 1 − q ≤ k ≤ 1 − q

or 1 − q ≤ k ≤ [ q (1 − q )
2

+ 2(1 + q )C ] / q , exclusive becomes more prevalent
only if

In the case where αG ≦αB, as shown by the path A

2

3. If

α G is extremely high relative to α B ;
k ≤ 1 − q , manufacturers prefer

common

dealing to exclusive dealing both in the absence and in
the presence of the Internet channel.
Proof. The above corollary is derived by comparing the
equilibria before the emergence of the Internet channel
with those after.
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